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Abstract
Resource partitioning theory claims that “Increasing concentration
enhances the life chances of specialist organizations.” We systemati-
cally think through this theory, specify implicit background assump-
tions, sharpen concepts, and rigorously check the theory’s logic. As
a result, we increase the theory’s explanatory power, and claim—
contrary to received opinion—that under certain general conditions,
“resource partitioning” and the proliferation of specialists can take
place independently of organizational mass and relative size eﬀects,
size localized competition, diversifying consumer tastes, increasing
number of dimensions of the resource space, and changing niche widths.
Our analysis makes furthermore clear that specialist and generalist
strategies are asymmetric, and shows that not concentration enhances
the life chances of specialists but economies of scale instead. Under
the conditions explicated, we argue that if scale economies come to
dominate, the number of organizations in the population increases,
regardless of the incumbents’ sizes.
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11 Introduction
The value of a ﬁeld of science is in the theories it produces. For a scientiﬁc
theory to be valuable, it must be unambiguous and logical. Many social
science texts that present theory are not clear, though (Sutton and Staw
1995), leaving the burden of disambiguating and tracing the theory’s logic
on the readers of these texts. For such texts, valuable ideas may not be fully
comprehended and exploited. Relieving this burden is very diﬃcult in the
case of discursive theories (i.e., presented in natural language), since natural
language has no clearcut benchmarks to check or improve the theory’s logic.
As a consequence, theory development and scientiﬁc debate are unnecessarily
impaired. To increase logical rigor and precision, and to raise the level of
discussion to a new level, representing the core argument of a theory in formal
logic is an approved method (Suppes 1968; Kyburg 1968; P´ eli et al. 1994;
Hannan 1997; Kamps and P´ olos 1999).
Logical formalization has recently been applied, among others, to various
parts of organizational ecology. In terms of explanatory and predictive power,
this is one of the most advanced sociological theories. Although in better
shape than most other theories in the ﬁeld, it turned out not to be logically
perfect. Logical formalization can help to resolve ambiguities, explicate tacit
assumptions, improve the theory’s logic, increase parsimony, and infer new
and unforeseen conclusions (P´ eli et al. 1994; Kamps and Masuch 1997; P´ eli
and Masuch 1997; Bruggeman 1997b; P´ eli 1997; Hannan 1998). As part of
this larger eﬀort, we want to analyze and formalize the explanatory structure
of resource partitioning theory (Carroll 1985).
Resource partitioning has become one of the most important parts of orga-
nizational ecology (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Carroll and Hannan 1995), and
deals with the population dynamics of competing generalist and specialist or-
ganizations. Its main claim is that “Increasing concentration enhances the
life chances of specialist organizations” (Carroll and Hannan 1995, p.p.217).
Along with the proliferation of specialists, the theory claims there is less niche
overlap and competition between specialists and generalists (i.e., resource
partitioning). This relatively new theory is particularly interesting because
it stands in stark contrast with older views from industrial economics. The
latter sees high concentration as a barrier to entry, especially for small orga-
nizations (Barney and Ouchi 1986, p.p.373, 374). Many empirical researchers
have seen ﬁt to test resource partitioning’s claims, and they found corrobo-
rating evidence for resource partitioning in the car industry (Hannan et al.
1995), banking (Freeman and Lomi 1994; Lomi 1995), newspapers (Car-
roll 1985), the telephone industry (Barnett and Carroll 1987) beer brewery
(Swaminathan and Carroll 1995), wine making (Swaminathan 1995), audit-
2ing (Boone, Br¨ ocheler, and Carroll 2000), hi-tech industries (Mitchell 1995;
Wade 1996), and the American feature ﬁlm industry (Mezias and Mezias
1999). These ﬁndings are important, because higher entry rates of new ﬁrms
(here, of specialists) are often associated with innovation, increased product
choice, and industry renewal (Thornton 1999).
By passing resource partitioning “through the purgatory of proofs and
refutations,” as Lakatos (1976) phrased it, we want to get the listed advan-
tages of logical formalization. Furthermore, we will attempt to show the
redundancy of a number of assertions from organizational ecology, that a
number of theorists believe to be necessary in the explanatory argument.
In sum, we will try to generalize and increase the explanatory power of the
theory at hand, and use logic as our tool.
Compared to logical formalization, computer simulation (Carley and Prietula
1994; Sastry 1997; Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999) and mathematics (Sørensen
1978; Coleman 1990) are relatively well known formal approaches, that also
increase rigor and precision. These two approaches are well suited to keep
track of a great deal of variables and their interactions, and simulation in
particular makes possible to explore highly complex problems, both empir-
ical and virtual (Axelrod 1997). For analyzing complex theories and their
explanatory arguments, however, computer supported logical formalization
is suited best. It is an approach complementary to the other two.
Logical formalization can stay relatively close to a source text, whereas
mathematics and simulation often require to impose strong assumptions
about metrics (P´ eli 1997; Hannan 1997). In the context of analyzing theo-
ries, logic can be seen as critical reﬂection on reasoning, with mathematical
precision. If the conclusions of a theory are inferred logically, then in all
models (i.e., instances of the pertaining sentences) where the assumptions
are true, the conclusions must also be true. The other two approaches, in
contrast, can show that in some models, both assumptions and conclusions
are true (Kamps and P´ olos 1999). It goes without saying that along with
analyzing existing theories, all three strands of formal techniques can help
developing new theories.
In this paper, we formalize resource partitioning theory in 5 steps, with
iterations if necessary. First, we extract the main claims and their sup-
portive arguments from the text (Section 2.1). These claims and arguments
taken together, we see as the core theory. Analyzing and sharpening key
concepts in the core theory is our second step (Section 2.2). In the third
step (Section 2.3), we focus on the structure of argument. We distinguish
premises (i.e., assumptions, deﬁnitions, or “background” assumptions) from
3conclusions, use the sharpened concepts from step 2, and informally axiom-
atize the core theory. Loopholes in the argument (i.e., “hidden” background
assumptions), we ﬁll in the course of our analysis.
The ﬁrst three steps are, for short, a rational reconstruction of the the-
ory, preparing the ground for the formalization proper in step 4. In step 5,
we check the two essential logical properties—soundness and consistency—
computationally (Section 3). This is important because conclusions that
intuitively appear to follow from premises may nevertheless be false, and in-
tuitively implausible statements may turn out to be soundly derivable. Fur-
thermore, a computer check may reveal additional loopholes and other ﬂaws
in the argument, that have been overlooked by authors, reviewers, editors,
and formalizers. The results of the formalization are presented in Section 4,
followed by a discussion in Section 5.
2 Rational reconstruction
Resource partitioning is about competing subpopulations of specialists and
generalists, and asks “under what conditions will the specialist form be viable
and why?” (Carroll and Hannan 1995, p.p.215). Before we go into the source
text, we explicate some conceptual background from organizational ecology
(Hannan and Freeman 1977; Hannan and Carroll 1992), that is important in
resource partitioning theory.
Organizations tap resources from their environment, and the set of re-
sources they tap is called their realized niche. The set of resources an organi-
zation could potentially tap in the absence of competitors, given its technol-
ogy, goals, and market strategy, is its fundamental niche. Populational niches
need not concern us at the moment. Two organizations compete if and only
if their fundamental niches “overlap,” and overlap means set intersection.
Competition thus increases with niche overlap (Hannan and Freeman 1989).
In organizational ecology, organizations are seen as inert, which means
most of them cannot adapt ﬂexible to their environment (Hannan and Free-
man 1984). If they are founded in a particular population (a collection of
organizations with overlapping niches and similar form), they are likely to
stay in that population for the rest of their lives. Generalists do not become
specialists or vice versa. Whereas organizational structures are inert, niches
may expand, shrink or drift, due to changes in the environment, organiza-
tional change (although rare), or both.
42.1 Core theory
Resource partitioning theory was published in 1985 by Glenn Carroll, but our
main source is a more recent and slightly expanded treatment in a textbook
(Carroll and Hannan 1995, p.p.215-221). This text has 92 sentences, of which
seven qualify as core theory. The remainder 85 sentences rephrase (parts of)
the core theory, give examples, describe concepts, pose the research question,
establish connections to other chapters of the textbook, or are additional
assumptions. Of these remainder assumptions, we will try to show they are
redundant.
Thus our core theory (see Table 1) is a set of quotations from Carroll and
Hannan (1995, p.p.216-217), in their order of appearance in the text. Notice
that in the text they appear next to each other.
1. Early in these markets, when the arena is crowded, most ﬁrms vie for
the largest possible resource base.
2. Competition forces each to specialize to some extent to diﬀerentiate
itself, although the overall strategy adopted by most ﬁrms is generalist
in nature.
3. As scale economies come to dominate, only a few generalists survive
and they move toward the center of the market.
4. This lessened crowding of generalists and their move to the center opens
up small pockets of resources on the periphery of the market, and it is
here that specialist forms usually appear and thrive.
5. In fact, the market at this point has been partitioned into generalist
and specialist resources.
6. The key predictive variable in the model is the overall level of market
concentration. [Italics in the original.]
7. When the market is not highly concentrated, specialist organizational
forms will not do as well as they do when it is highly concentrated.
Table 1: Core theory
5Questions
With respect to the core theory, one could ask if it can explain resource
partitioning and the proliferation of specialists. Moreover, there exist six ad-
ditional assertions in organizational ecology, of which it is generally believed
that at least some are necessary in the explanation of (part of) the outcome.
First, some have argued that large organizations exert stronger competitive
pressure on small organizations than the other way around, because the for-
mer have greater market power. It has been proven mathematically that this
assertion added to the core theory accounts for the outcome (Bruggeman
1997a). Second, large organizations consume larger resources than small or-
ganizations. Some argue that if a large generalist dies and the volume of the
resource base does not decrease, resources are freed and resource pockets are
opened for several small specialists to enter. In fact, this is an almost literal
reading of core sentence 4, and this reading would certainly help to explain
the proliferation of specialists. Third, organizational ecology has a model
of size localized competition (Hannan et al. 1990), wherein organizations
of similar size compete more strongly than organizations of very dissimilar
sizes. This model can account for the outﬂow of middle sized organizations
(here, small generalists) and the subsequent inﬂow of small specialists.
From a parsimony point of view, either assertion would require to in-
crease the “weight” of the core theory by an assumption about the eﬀect of
organizational size, plus the conceptual ambiguity surrounding this notion.
Moreover, it would suggest that resource partitioning occurs only in domains
where such an additional assumption holds.
Fourth, empirical evidence suggests that at some point, consumers de-
velop a greater variety of tastes, leading to a larger market periphery, i.e.,
a larger resource base for specialists where they can ﬂourish (Carroll and
Hannan 1995, p.219). In this case, explaining the proliferation of special-
ists is rather trivial. Fifth, P´ eli and Nooteboom (1999) made an analogy
between niche positioning and the problem of sphere packing from physics.
They claim, on the basis of an intricate mathematical model that is not
in their paper, that the resource space for specialists grows if the number
of dimensions of the resource space increases. And sixth, the source text
(p.p.218-9) argues that the niche width of the few surviving generalists in-
creases, although it is not clear from the text how this eﬀect inﬂuences the
outcome.
We ask for each of these six assertions if it is necessary for the explanatory
argument. Our aim is to establish a parsimonious set of premises on the
basis of the source text, and closely related information from organizational
ecology if necessary. If we succeed, the insight gained is that additional
6causes, phrased in the above assertions, are not necessary for the outcome to
occur. Such insight can lead to re-interpretations of previous research and a
new understanding of the process of resource partitioning.
2.2 Key concepts
In the second step, we analyze the important concepts occurring in sentences
of the core theory, and their relations, if any.
Resource base, market, and arena
A key notion is that of resource base. The resource base of a (sub)population
is the set of all resources from which the organizations in the (sub)population
tap. This set is also called the niche of the (sub)population (Hannan and
Freeman 1989). A resource base can be partitioned into a center and a
periphery. In the center, resources are relatively abundant compared to the
periphery where resources are more scarce. Center and periphery are not
spatial concepts, although in some cases they may take a spatial meaning,
for instance for newspapers with regionally diﬀerent readers.
In core sentence 1 the notion “arena” is used as a synonym for resource
base; in sentence 3, 4, and 5 the synonym “market” is used. In sentence 1,
6, and 7, however, market is used as an equivalent of population. For clar-
ity, we will abstain from arena and market as synonyms for resource base,
also because in most organizational theories, market denotes a collection of
resources and organizations.
Generalists and specialists
Generalists and specialists are deﬁned in terms of “niche width,” and have
wide and narrow niches respectively (Freeman and Hannan 1983; Carroll
and Hannan 1995, p.p.215). Each organizational population considered in
resource partitioning theory contains a generalist subpopulation and a spe-
cialist subpopulation, and organizations are either generalist or specialist. In
core sentence 1, generalists are said to “vie for the largest possible resource
base.” The strategy of these generalists is to include as many resources as
possible in their organizational niche. Having a wide niche and aiming at the
center of the resource base both contribute to the generalist strategy.
In core sentence 2, organizations specialize “to diﬀerentiate themselves.”
Here, the strategy of specializing is to avoid competitive pressures by reducing
the crowding (see below for a deﬁnition) of the niche. Having a narrow niche
and aiming at the periphery of the resource base are ways to live up to the
7specialist strategy. Incorporating many resources and avoiding competitive
pressures are asymmetric strategies. A consequence of the generalist-versus-
specialist strategies is that generalists’ niches are usually more crowded than
specialists’.
The phrase “Generalists move toward the center of the resource base”
is a ﬁgure of speech which means that the niches of generalist organizations
increasingly include abundant resources. Notice that for resource partitioning
theory, it does not matter if resources, e.g., consumer tastes, change while
generalist organizations do not, or if generalist organizations change their
position with respect to the resource base.
Economies of scale
The text is clear on this concept: “An economy of scale exists when the
per-unit cost of producing a product or service declines with the number of
units produced.” Scale economies are a main determinant for the growth of
large ﬁrms that enjoy these economies.
Crowding
The notion of crowding is not deﬁned in the source text, but its meaning
is essential in the explanatory argument. There exists one deﬁnition in or-
ganizational ecology (Podolny et al. 1996) and we will use it. Crowding is
deﬁned as the degree to which organizations tap from the same resources. If
many organizations aim at a relatively limited number of resources, organiza-
tional niches are crowded. If organizations diﬀerentiate themselves and aim
at diﬀerent resources, crowding is low. Podolny et al. (1996, p.666) focus on
individual organizations in their study, and deﬁne, inspired by McPherson
(1983), a crowding measure of an organizational niche as the sum of its niche
overlaps by other organizations.
symbols: A(i) : crowding of the niche of organization i
n : number of organizations in a population
a(ij) : extent to which the fundamental niche of organization i
is overlapped by that of organization j





8Niche overlap deﬁned as set intersection is a mathematical and clearly deﬁned
notion that abstracts away from niche dimensions. If another organization
has full niche overlap with the focal organization (i.e., the set intersection
equals the niche of the focal organization), then a(ij) is assigned the value 1.
If there is no niche overlap (i.e., the set intersection is empty), then a(ij)=0 .
So, the value of the term a(ij) ranges between zero and one.
Since resource partitioning is about (sub)populations, the theory must
have a deﬁnition of crowding at the (sub)population level, which can be
simply constructed on the basis of Podolny’s deﬁnition. The crowding of a
populational resource base, is the crowding of the niches of all organizations
in the population.
symbols: cr : crowding of the populational resource base
A : mean crowding of organizational niches





In analogy to the deﬁnition of populational crowding, the crowding measure
of the generalist subpopulation is the sum of the crowding of all generalist
niches, by generalists or by specialists (that may to some extent tap the same
resources as generalists). The same argument applies to the specialist sub-
population. Deﬁnition 2b and 2c give measures for generalist and specialist
crowding, respectively.
symbols:
crg : crowding of the generalist resource crs : crowding of the specialist resource
base base
ng : number of generalist organizations ns : number of specialist organizations
Ag : mean crowding of generalist niches As : mean crowding of specialist niches
Def 2b. Generalist crowding
crg = ngAg
Def 2c. Specialist crowding
crs = nsAs
Because in resource partitioning theory, all organizations are either generalist
or specialist, the sum of generalist and specialist crowding is equal to the
populational crowding, cr = crg + crs.
9Competition
Competition is undeﬁned in the source text, but is well deﬁned in Hannan
and Carroll’s textbooks. Like crowding (Def.1), competition increases with
niche overlap and with the number of organizations; populational compe-
tition is the aggregate of competitive ties in the population (Hannan and
Carroll 1992), like crowding here. In the explanatory argument of resource
partitioning, crowding is therefore equivalent to competition.
Concentration
Concentration denotes, informally speaking, the degree to which the re-
sources in a market are tapped or controlled by a small number of ﬁrms
of the population in that market. Usually, concentration is deﬁned as the
ratio of the aggregate size of the (3 or 4) largest ﬁrms to that of all ﬁrms in
the population (Shepherd 1987). Carroll’s original paper has (1) “economic
concentration” (Carroll 1985, p.1262), which presumably denotes the above
deﬁnition from economics, and (2) “resource concentration” (p.1275) that
probably coincides with the preceding meaning, because large organizations
take large resources from the resource base and small organizations small
resources. The source text is more ambiguous, and has (3) “ownership con-
centration” (Carroll and Hannan 1995, p.184), along with a table in which (4)
concentration is the number of organizations operating in the same market
(Carroll and Hannan 1995, Table 9-1, p.185), and there is (5) concentration
of specialists and of generalists independently (Carroll and Hannan 1995,
p.p.192, 216). Perhaps generalist concentration could mean the same as (6)
concentration of the “general interest mass market” (Carroll 1985, p.1276),
because generalists are mostly there. We suspend deciding upon this matter
and discuss concentration later, after investigating its role in the argument.
Resource partitioning
The concept of resource partitioning denotes a decrease of the extent to which
generalists and specialists tap from the same resources (Carroll and Hannan
1995, p.217), i.e., decreasing niche overlap of specialists and generalists1.
In our interpretation, the opening up of small pockets of resources in the
periphery (sentence 4) is a ﬁgure of speech and not meant literally. Again, it
1The notion of resource partitioning suggests a partitioning of resources in a mathe-
matical sense, as a subdivision of a set into subsets, such that each element of the set is
in one of these subsets, and in no more than one. These mathematical properties hold
for the resource base, which is partitioned into a center and a periphery, but not for the
niches of the specialist and generalist subpopulations, which do overlap to some extent.
10is not important if specialists and generalists move away from each other or
resources get partitioned between specialists and generalists. The eﬀect of
both is decreasing niche overlap of generalists and specialists, which in our
view is the important point.
Resource partitioning processes start “early in these markets” (sentence 1).
We will refer to this point in time as the starting point of resource partitioning
processes. Since the source text does not describe an end point of the process,
we will not have it in our formal representation either. These considerations
complete our analysis of concepts.
2.3 Informal axiomatization
We will now focus on the structure of the argument. Our goal is to informally
axiomatize the core theory, by representing it as a set of relatively short
statements with a clear logical structure. Synonymous concepts are mapped
onto one notion, using the above analyses.
For each resulting sentence, its role in the argument is tagged. These
roles can be premise, or conclusion. A major conclusion is called a theorem
(abbreviated Thm), an intermediate conclusion a lemma (L). In addition
to these sentences, background assumptions will be added if necessary. A
premise can be an assumption (A) a background assumption (BA), or a
deﬁnition (Def).
Core sentences 1 and 2
The ﬁrst two core sentences provide information about the conditions that
hold “early in these markets,” that is, at the starting point of resource parti-
tioning. At that time, “most ﬁrms vie for the largest possible resource base”
and “the overall strategy adopted by most ﬁrms is clearly generalist in na-
ture.” We will not use this boundary condition and show that the outcome
of the process can occur for any initial ratio of generalist and specialist ﬁrms.
Furthermore, “competition forces each to specialize in some extent.” A
straightforward reading of this phrase would be that, after the starting point,
when competition is high, organizations actively limit the crowding of their
niches to avoid increasing competitive pressures. But if one assumes that
literally each organization has this strategy, a single organization that has
not would falsify the assumption. An interpretation that is more in line
with the Darwinian perspective of organizational ecology is that due to high
competitive forces, organizations with relatively lower niche crowding are
favored by selection over organizations with higher niche crowding (and for
11other properties similar). This assumption is about average rather than
individual organizations.
A1After the starting point, the mean crowding of generalist niches will
not increase.
A2After the starting point, the mean crowding of specialist niches will
not increase.
Sentence 1 states that at the starting point, “the arena is crowded.” The
high levels of crowding, implying high levels of competition, suggest that at
the starting point of resource partitioning, the environment must be near or
at its carrying capacity for the population. We veriﬁed this conjecture with
the author, who conﬁrmed that the process of resource partitioning, as well
as the decline of generalists and the proliferation of specialist organizations
usually starts, roughly, shortly after the growth of a population has come to
a halt (Carroll, personal communication).
Core sentence 3
The third core sentence mentions three events. First, “scale economies come
to dominate,” second “only a few generalists survive” and third “they move
toward the center of the market.” Since economies of scale increase mortality
rates in organizational populations (p.216), we rephrase the ﬁrst part of the
sentence in the following manner.
A3If scale economies come to dominate, the number of generalist
organizations decreases.
The second part of the sentence says that the niches of the remaining gener-
alist organizations move toward the center of the resource base:
A4If the number of generalist organizations decreases, the niches of the
remaining generalists move toward the center of the resource base.
Core sentences 4 and 5
Sentence 4 says that “This lessened crowding of generalists and their move
to the center opens up small niche pockets on the periphery of the resource
base,” and furthermore that “it is here that specialists often appear and
thrive.” The cause for this lessened crowding of generalists is indicated by
core sentence 3: the decreasing number of generalist organizations, due to
the dominance of scale economies. From Deﬁnition 2, however, it follows
12that not only the number of generalist organizations, but also the mean
crowding of generalist niches determines the level of generalist crowding.
Assumption 1 states that after the starting point of resource partitioning,
the mean crowding of generalist niches will not increase. This allows us to
propose the ﬁrst part of core sentence 4 as an intermediate result,
L1If, after the starting point, scale economies come to dominate,
generalist crowding decreases.
If generalists move toward the center, their niche overlap with specialist or-
ganizations in the periphery presumably decreases. This decrease, then, will
result in a lower mean crowding of specialist niches. Lower mean crowding
enhances the life chances of specialist organizations and accounts for their
proliferation. In other words, if we may assume that,
A5If generalist niches move toward the center of the resource base, the
mean crowding of specialist niches decreases.
which, after all, is in line with the opening up of small pockets of resources
on the periphery, we can derive the last part of core sentence 4,
L2If, after the starting point, generalist niches move toward the center
of the resource base, and the crowding of specialists does not decrease,
the number of specialists increases.
Core sentence 5 says that at this point (later than the starting point) the
resource base has become partitioned into generalist and specialist resources.
Since we interpreted resource partitioning as decreasing niche overlap of spe-
cialists and generalists, we rephrase core sentence 5 accordingly.
A6If generalist niches move toward the center of the resource base, the
mean overlap of generalist and specialist niches decreases.
Let us brieﬂy return to the starting point and ask ourselves what happens
to populational crowding afterwards. Density dependence theory (Hannan
and Carroll 1992) explains that at the carrying capacity (so at all times af-
ter the starting point of resource partitioning), perturbations of populational
competition (hence crowding) are dampened, and competition returns to an
equilibrium state. An increase of competition causes organizational outﬂow,
which in turn reduces competition. Conversely, a decrease of competition al-
lows for organizational inﬂow, due to which competition will increase. Since
the same argument holds for crowding, we specify this in a background as-
sumption.
13BA 1 After the starting point, populational crowding is (approximately)
stationary.
From density dependence theory, it seems to follow that after the carrying
capacity has been reached, the number of organization neither declines nor
resurges. When unpacking the crowding measure (Def 2), one notices that
the number of organizations and their niche overlaps can vary independently.
This independence makes possible to sidesteps a possible contradiction with
density dependence, that does not have niche overlap as a parameter in its
models. So, when density dependence has it that at the carrying capacity,
populational competition stays at the same level, the number of organiza-
tions may decrease or increase if at the same time their mean niche overlap
increases or decreases, respectively.
In core sentence 4, the proliferation of specialist organizations is suggested
to be a consequence of both the lessened crowding of generalists and their
move to the center. Lemma 2 claims, however, that generalists’ move to
the center is a suﬃcient condition for increasing numbers of specialists. We
claim that also the lessened crowding of generalists is a suﬃcient condition for
specialist proliferation. Since after the starting point, populational crowding
remains stationary (BA 1), and populational crowding is the summation of
generalist and specialist crowding (Def 2), we can derive that,
L3If, after the starting point, generalist crowding decreases, specialist
crowding increases.
Because after the starting point, the mean crowding of specialist niches does
not increase (A 1), it must be the case that the number of specialist organi-
zations increases.
L4If, after the starting point, generalist crowding decreases, the number
of specialists increases.
Core sentence 4 states that the “lessened crowding of generalist and their
move to the center” entail specialist proliferation. We have just argued that
both events independently can cause the proliferation of specialists. Because
specialist numbers can increase without generalists moving to the center, this
increase can also be expected in populations in stable environments and with
highly inert organizations that do not move.
Core Sentences 6 and 7
Sentence 6 says that “the key predictive variable in the model is the overall
level of market concentration.” Finally, sentence 7 says that “When the
14market is not highly concentrated, specialist organizational forms will not
do as well as when it is highly concentrated.” These summarizing sentences
address the research question and therefore are theorem candidates.
From the text (p.216) it seems that scale economies cause concentration
to increase, although it is not said explicitly. But even if our reading be-
tween the lines is correct, it is certainly not said in the source text that
the “predictive variable” concentration causes any of the other events de-
scribed. Therefore we can not use sentence 6 in the explanation, but claim
that not concentration but economies of scale cause resource partitioning and
the proliferation of specialists. To substantiate our claim, we have to prove
the following theorems,
Thm 1 If economies of scale come to dominate, niche overlap between
generalists and specialists decreases.
Thm 2 If, after the starting point, economies of scale come to dominate,
the number of specialist organizations increases.
If we succeed to prove the two theorems, then we have shown that con-
centration, as well as the six additional assertions (see Section 2.1), are not
necessary in the explanation of resource partitioning processes. We have now
completed our rational reconstruction of the text, and have prepared a set
of statements to be formalized.
3 Formalization
The set of statements is the point of departure for our logical formalization.
To represent the statements formally (see Appendix), we use standard ﬁrst-
order logic (introductory: Gamut 1991; Barwise and Etchemendy 1990; an
overview: Hodges 1983; advanced: van Dalen 1994). First-order logic has
explicit rules for constructing well-formed expressions in the language; strict
rules of inference by which new expressions can be derived from existing ones;
and, formal semantics by which the researcher can “see” in an exact manner
what the world according to a theory looks like.
We evaluate our formal representation according to logical criteria. The
formal theory should be, ﬁrst, consistent and second, sound. The reason
for working in this order is that according to the principle ex falso sequitur
quodlibet (from falsehood everything follows), an inconsistent theory is au-
tomatically “sound” but not in a way any scientist would want it to be.
Only those theorems should be derivable that follow from a consistent set of
premises.
15Consistency
If a theory is inconsistent, i.e., if it says that both φ and not-φ are true, it
can not describe any possible state of aﬀairs in the world, and can not have
a model in a technical sense too (Chang and Keisler 1990). Since we want
resource partitioning theory to be consistent, we have to show that it has
a model in which all sentences are true. To produce a formal model of the
theory, we use an automated model generator, MACE2, that runs on the set
of formal premises.
MACE produced a model of our formal representation, and we can be
sure that the formal representation is consistent.
Soundness
We test the derivability of theorems and lemmas using an automated theorem
prover, OTTER (Wos et al. 1991). The theorem prover is given a set of (non-
contradictory) premises and the negation of the statement to be proven. If
the theorem prover ﬁnds a contradiction, then the negated statement is false.
Ergo: the statement is true.
The theorem prover conﬁrmed that each of the lemmas and theorems is
derivable from the premises, so our representation of resource partitioning
theory is sound.
4 Results
On the basis of the logical formalization, we can now explain resource par-
titioning and the proliferation of specialists, in a sound, consistent, and sur-
prisingly parsimonious way. In the explanation, we have not used any of the
six additional assertions (see Section 2.1). They are redundant, which means
that resource partitioning and the proliferation of specialists can take place
without relative size eﬀects on competition; relative size eﬀects on the avail-
ability of resources (i.e., small pockets in the resource base for specialists);
size localized competition; a larger periphery due to diversifying consumer
tastes; a higher number of dimensions of the resource space; and, changing
niche widths of surviving generalists.
According to the source text, at the starting point, most ﬁrms pursue a
generalist strategy (“vie for the largest possible resource base”). We have
not used this information in any derivation, which shows that the ratio of
2Both automated model generator MACE and automated theorem prover OTTER that
we use can be down-loaded from http://www-unix.mcs.anl.gov/AR/otter/
16specialists and generalists at the start does not matter for the outcome. Fur-
thermore, we have shown that niche widths, partly characterizing specialists
and generalists, are not necessary for the explanation either. Our results thus
point out a far more general class of settings where the process of resource
partitioning can be expected to occur.
Lemma 1–3 have demonstrated that lessened crowding of generalists is
a suﬃcient condition for the increasing number of specialists, and general-
ists’ move to the center is not necessary for the outcome to occur. The
latter implies that also in stable environments and with highly inert thus
non-moving generalists, specialists can proliferate. Last but not least, con-
centration, presented as the “key predictive variable” in the source text,
plays no explanatory role. As a consequence, the two theorems answering
the question “under what conditions will the specialist form be viable and
why?” emphasize the role of economies of scale rather than concentration
for resource partitioning (Thm 1) and the proliferation of specialists (Thm 2).
Going beyond the source text, one may ask if these two outcomes in their
turn inﬂuence the density of the population. In several empirical studies, on
automobile manufacturers (Carroll and Hannan 1995, p.206) and breweries
(Swaminathan and Carroll 1995, p.224) among others, the number of orga-
nizations has been found to increase unexpectedly, after a period of stability
or decline. On the basis of our logical formalization, we can derive a theo-
rem that might explain the increasing number of organizations. Due to the
generalist and specialist strategies in resource partitioning theory, the mean
crowding of generalist niches is higher than that of specialist niches. Further-
more, from the starting point onwards, the mean crowding of both generalist
and specialist niches does not increase (A 1 and A 2). Since populational
crowding is stationary (BA 1), it not only follows that the number of spe-
cialists increases (Thm 2), but also that the number of in-ﬂowing specialists
is larger than the number of out-ﬂowing generalists. This means that the
number of organizations in the population increases.
To end our formalization eﬀort with this new result, we formally derive
it as Theorem 3. We ﬁrst assume explicitly that,
A7At the starting point, the mean crowding of generalist niches is
higher than the mean crowding of specialist niches.
Subsequently, we derive a new lemma, starting from Deﬁnition 2, that says
that,
L5If the crowding of the resource base is stationary (BA 1), and the mean
crowding of both generalist and specialist niches does not increase (A 1,2),
17and the mean crowding of generalist niches is initially higher than
that of specialist niches (A 7), then the inﬂow of specialists is higher
than the outﬂow of generalists.
The automated model generator conﬁrmed that the set of premises, with
Assumption 7 added, is consistent. Moreover, the theorem prover derived
Theorem 3, saying that,
Thm 3 If, after the starting point scale economies come to dominate,
specialist inﬂow is higher than generalist outﬂow.
This theorem is surprising because it is normally believed that for in-
creasing density to occur, it is necessary that specialists are smaller than
generalists and can thrive on less resources, or else that diversifying con-
sumer tastes lead to a larger market periphery or to a higher dimensionality
of the resource space. We have just proven that none of these assertions is
necessary.
5 Discussion
In the long long ago, scientists took their time to study each textbook ex-
tensively. In our information-overloaded society, hardly anyone has the time
for such extensive study, but still everyone expects to learn a great deal from
textbooks and scientiﬁc journals. Ambiguous or sloppy discourse with many
unnecessary assumptions impedes comprehension, and it is therefore impor-
tant to have clear, parsimonious and logical theories with high explanatory
power. With such theories, more facts can be understood on the basis of
fewer information to start with. We believe that the reconstructed, and rig-
orously checked, theory of resource partitioning theory meets this modern
demand.
A number of assertions from organizational ecology, as well as some as-
sumptions from the core theory turned out to be redundant for explaining
resource partitioning (Thm 1) and the proliferation of specialists (Thm 2),
as we argued in the previous section. We have proven these two theorems,
not just argued for them by example, metaphor, empirical generalization,
or other questionable ways of reasoning that frequently pass for theory in
social science (Sutton and Staw 1995). This means that the theorems and
the redundancy of the listed assertions are true beyond reasonable doubt,
provided that the assumptions are true, no matter how counter-intuitive the
results may seem.
18Logical support is far stronger than empirical support can ever be. The
only empirical contribution that is on equal level is counter evidence against
a theoretical statement (Popper 1959). In the case of resource partitioning,
the published empirical results are aﬃrmative, but conﬁrmation does not add
new explanatory information, and does not prove that the explanations are
sound.
Along with logical rigor, one could ask if our results are robust. For
sure, they strongly depend on the (generalized) deﬁnition of crowding from
organizational ecology. To prove the theorems, this deﬁnition, or another
one wherein crowding depends on the number of organizations and on niche
overlap, is necessary. The results also depend on the existence of a carrying
capacity, that imposes a (ﬂexible) upper bound on crowding. If crowding
levels are too high, organizations disband or their niche overlap decreases
until crowding has landed on its equilibrium level. Furthermore, if generalist
niches would be less crowded than specialist niches (contrary to A 7), then
Theorem 3 would not longer hold.
The main diﬀerence between Theorem 1 and 2 on the one hand and the
source text on the other hand, is the explanatory role of economies of scale
versus concentration, respectively. One could ask how important this diﬀer-
ence is. If, on the one hand, economies of scale come to dominate, some orga-
nizations, with the highest economies of scale, grow (much) larger than the
other organizations in the population, middle-sized generalists disband, and
(small) specialists proliferate. Then the level of concentration increases ac-
cordingly. If, on the other hand, concentration increases, this increase might
be indicative for economies of scale. If this argument is true, concentration
is a proxy for economies of scale, and can be used in empirical studies. The
claim that concentration is “the key predictive variable” (sentence 6) though,
is not supported by the remainder of the source text. Moreover, recent em-
pirical ﬁndings in the higher education publishing industry, are at odds with
the positive correrelation of concentration and economies of scale. Thorn-
ton (1999) found concentration to increase while economies of scale, and the
number of foundings, decreased. Her ﬁndings seem to be inconsistent with
sentences 6 and 7 from the core theory, but are consistent with our reading
and formal representation.
In our formal representation, we have economies of scale at the far end
of the explanation, and one may of course put a question mark right there.
In some branches, like retail, it might be the case that mergers or fusions,
not treated in the current text, cause economies of scale. At the same time,
anticipated economies of scale may trigger fusions and mergers, complicating
the causal picture. On top of these, fusions and mergers will also increase
19organizational outﬂow directly, as well as concentration. Compared to this
picture, the current formal theory is a somewhat simpliﬁed, although correct,
representation of more complicated social phenomena.
According to the text, specialists attempt to have low competitive pressure,
hence low niche overlap from other organizations. One could ask What if
specialists’ eﬀorts to diﬀerentiate themselves are counteracted by generalists
(or other specialists), or remain without success because of scarce peripheral
resources? According to our core model (as captured by Def 2), the number
of specialists would then not increase. This outcome is in line with industrial
economics, which does not assume strategy diﬀerences between small (i.e.,
specialist) and large (i.e., generalist) organizations. Resource partitioning
does assume a strategy diﬀerence, and our model shows that this diﬀerence
accounts for the dissension between ecologists and economists.
One could also ask a more elementary question. What if specialists at-
tempt to have no niche overlap at all? Without niche overlap, they would not
have any competitive pressure, which would, according to organizational ecol-
ogy at least, be a splendid condition for survival. Baum and Mezias (1992)
and Baum and Haveman (1997) have studied the Manhattan hotel industry
and argued that proximity is good for survival, because an agglomeration of
hotels apparently attracts far more customers than each hotel individually
would. From their studies one can infer that niche overlap is beneﬁcial to a
certain extent.
To generalize organizational ecology and to unify diﬀerent strands of re-
search, one could establish a conceptualization wherein niche overlap and the
number of organizations together determine the dynamics of (sub)popula-
tions. Niche overlap acts as an “attracting” force on organizations (more
resources) and at the same time as a “repelling” force (stronger competi-
tion). In such a general theory, also the eﬀect of organizational mass should
be taken into account. Barron (1999) argues convincingly that mass eﬀects
explain the decline of populational density after a maximum, a “stylized
fact” that we can not explain in our current model. Our formalization of
resource partitioning can be expanded with assumptions that capture such
ﬁndings and considerations. The logical framework, possibly complemented
by mathematical modeling or computer simulation, can provide the rigor and
precision necessary for strong theory.
Thus a formal representation of a theory is not a rigid end station, but
a step toward new understanding. It is superior to its natural language
counterpart for thoroughly examining alternative assumptions, and provides
a stepping stone for further developments of the theory. But formal theory
is no panacea. Other than formal ways of thinking remain indispensable, as
20well as empirical research and statistical inferencing.
In the case of resource partitioning, it took us about two years to resolve
conceptual ambiguities, to ﬁll loopholes in the argument, and to make a
consistent, sound, and relatively simple reconstruction of the source text.
We felt like medieval hermeneuticians, equipped with high-tech automated
theorem provers. Now we leave it to the reader to decide if it was worth the
eﬀort.
21Appendix: Logical Representation
First-Order Logic has symbols for constants, functions and relations, that we
introduce in Table 2. In addition to these symbols, logic has two quantiﬁers,
∀ (for all) and ∃ (there exists), and ﬁve logical connectives, ∧ (and), ∨ (or),
→ (if..., then ...), ↔ (if and only if) and ¬ (not).
symbols (in order of appearance):
SP(t) : time t is the starting point
x>y : x is larger than y
Ag(t) : mean crowding of generalist niches at t (function)
As(t) : mean crowding of specialist niches at t (function)
SE(t1,t 2) : scale economies dominate from times t1 to t2
ng(t) : number of generalists at time t (function)
GMC(t1,t 2) : generalist niches move to the center of the resource base
from t1 to t2
ags(t) : mean niche overlap between generalists and specialists
at t (function)
cr(t) : crowding of the resource base at t (function)
x   y : x is neither (signiﬁcantly) larger than y, nor (signiﬁcantly)
smaller than y
crg(t) : crowding of the generalist resource base at t (function)
crs(t) : crowding of the specialist resource base at t (function)
ns(t) : number of specialists in at t (function)
x − y : x minus y (function)
Table 2: Symbols used in the logical formalization.
Premisses
A1 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] →¬ (Ag(t2) > Ag(t1)) ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, and t2 is later than t1, then the mean
crowding of generalist niches will not be higher at t2 than at t1.
A2 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] →¬ (As(t2) > As(t1)) ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, and t2 is later than t1, then the mean
crowding of specialist niches will not be higher at t2 than at t1.
A3 ∀t1,t 2 [SE(t1,t 2) → [(ng(t1) >n g(t2)) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] ]
Read: If scale economies dominate from t1 to t2, then the number of
22generalists at t1 is higher than at t2,w h e r et2 is later than t1.
A4 ∀t1,t 2 [[ ( ng(t1) >n g(t2)) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] → GMC(t1,t 2)]
Read: If the number of generalists is higher at t1 than at t2,a n dt2 is later
than t1, then the generalist niches move toward the center of the
resource base from t1 to t2.
A5 ∀t1,t 2 [GMC(t1,t 2) → (As(t1) > As(t2))]
Read: If generalist niches move toward the center of the resource base from
t1 to t2, then the mean overlap between generalist and specialist
niches at t1 is larger than at t2.
A6 ∀t1,t 2 [GMC(t1,t 2) → (ags(t1) > ags(t2))]
Read: If generalist niches move toward the center of the resource base from
t1 to t2, then the mean niche overlap between generalists and specialists
at t1 is larger than at t2.
A7 ∀t1 [SP(t1) → (Ag(t1) > As(t1))]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, the mean crowding of generalist niches
at t1 is higher than the mean crowding of specialist niches at t1.
BA 1 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] → (cr(t1)   cr(t2)) ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, and t2 is later than t1, then the crowding
of the resource base generalist will be similar at t1 and t2.
We add an additional background assumption (BA 2), stating that a starting
point of a resource partitioning process in a given population occurs only
once. In other words, if a starting point has been reached, it will not be
reached again. This is common sense background knowledge for humans,
but not for computers.
BA 2: ∀t1t2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] →¬ SP(t2)]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, and t2 is later than t1,t h e nt2 is not the
starting point.
23To be able to derive the lemmas and theorems, we also need to represent
Deﬁnition 2 in ﬁrst-order logic. Rather that translating the equalities straight
away, we need for our derivations certain inequalities that trivially follow
from this deﬁnition. For instance in the equality crg = ngAg,i fAg does
not increase and ng decreases, then it is obvious that crg must also decrease.
This inequality we call Corollary 1. In a similar way we get Corollary 2a, 2b
and 3.
Cor 1 ∀t1,t 2 [[ ¬(Ag(t2) > Ag(t1)) ∧ (ng(t1) >n g(t2))] → (crg(t1) >c r g(t2)) ]
Read: If the mean crowding of generalist niches is not higher at t2 than at t1,
and the number of generalists is higher at t1 than at t2, then the
generalist resource base is more crowded at t1 than at t2.
Cor 2a ∀t1,t 2 [[ ( crs(t2) >c r s(t1)) ∧¬ (As(t2) > As(t1))] → (ns(t2) >n s(t1)) ]
Read: If the specialist resource base is more crowded at t2 than at t1,a n d
the mean crowding of specialist niches is not higher at t2 than at t1,
then the number of specialists is higher at t2 than at t1.
Cor 2b ∀t1,t 2 [[ ¬(crs(t1) >c r s(t2)) ∧ (As(t1) > As(t2))] → (ns(t2) >n s(t1)) ]
Read: If the specialist resource base is not more crowded at t1 than at t2,
and the mean crowding of specialist niches is higher at t1 than at t2,
then the number of specialists is higher at t2 than at t1.
Cor 3 ∀t1,t 2 [[ ( cr(t1)   cr(t2)) ∧ (crg(t1) >c r g(t2))] → (crs(t2) >c r s(t1)) ]
Read: If the crowding of the resource base is similar at t1 and t2,a n dt h e
generalist resource base is more crowded at t1 than at t2, then the
specialist resource base is more crowded at t2 than at t1.
Lemmas
L1 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ SE(t1,t 2)] → (crg(t1) >c r g(t2)) ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, and scale economies dominate from t1 to t2,
then the generalist resource base is more crowded at t1 than at t2.
L2 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ GMC(t1,t 2) ∧¬ (crs(t1) >c r s(t2))] →
24(ns(t2) >n s(t1)) ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, generalist niches move toward the center
of the resource base from t1 to t2, and the crowding of the specialist
resource base is not higher at t1 than at t2, then the number of specialists
is higher at t2 than at t1.
L3 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ (crg(t1) >c r g(t2)) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] → (crs(t2) >c r s(t1)) ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, the generalist resource base is more crowded
at t1 than at t2,a n dt2 is later than t1, then the specialist resource
base is more crowded at t2 than at t1.
L4 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ (crg(t1) >c r g(t2)) ∧ (t2 >t 1)] → (ns(t2) >n s(t1)) ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, the generalist resource base is more crowded
at t1 than at t2,a n dt2 is later than t1, then the number of specialists
is higher at t2 than at t1.
L5 ∀t1,t 2 [[ ( cr(t1)   cr(t2)) ∧¬ (Ag(t2) > Ag(t1)) ∧¬ (As(t2) > As(t1))
∧ (Ag(t1) > As(t1))] → ((ns(t2) − ns(t1)) > (ng(t1) − ng(t2)) ]
Read: If the crowding of the resource base is similar at t1 and t2,t h e
mean crowding of generalist niches is not higher at t2 than at t1,
the mean crowding of specialist niches is not higher at t2 than
at t1, and the mean crowding of generalist niches at t1 is higher
than the mean crowding of specialist niches at t1, then the number
of specialists at t2 minus the number of specialists at t1 is higher
than the number of generalists at t1 minus the number of
generalists at t2.
Theorems
Thm 1 ∀t1,t 2 [SE(t1,t 2) → (ags(t1) > ags(t2))]
Read: If scale economies dominate from t1 to t2, then the mean niche overlap
between generalists and specialists is larger at t1 than at t2.
Thm 2 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ SE(t1,t 2)] → (ns(t2) >n s(t1)) ]
25Read: If t1 is the starting point, and scale economies dominate from t1
to t2, then the number of specialists is larger at t1 than at t2.
Thm 3 ∀t1,t 2 [[ SP(t1) ∧ SE(t1,t 2)] →
[(ng(t1) >n g(t2)) ∧ ((ns(t2) − ns(t1)) > (ng(t1) − ng(t2)))] ]
Read: If t1 is the starting point, and scale economies dominate from t1
to t2, then the number of generalists is higher at t1 than at t2,
and the number of specialists at t2 minus the number of
specialists at t1 is higher than the number of generalists at t1
minus the number of generalists at t2.
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